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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

BROWN'S SHOE FIT CO.,
an Iowa partnership; TOM
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APPELLEES' BRIEF
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Iowa partnership; BROWN'S
SHOE FIT CO., an Iowa
corporation; TOM BROWN;
BROWN'S GENERAL OFFICES, an
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JOHN DOES 2-5,
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I.
JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2(a)-3(2)(j).

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON CROSS APPEAL

1.

Did the district court commit error in dismissing 330

Partners' Counterclaim

for abuse of process where there was

substantial evidence that Brown's commenced this action for an
improper purpose, knowing it would not have agreed to lease the
Property under the terms of the Basic Lease Provisions document
which Brown's claims was breached by 330 Partners?
in Record:

[Preservation

R. 1125, 1319-25].

III.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES

None.

2

IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Course of Proceedings.

Appellants Brown Shoe Fit Company, Tom Brown and Brown's
General Office (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Brown's")
commenced

this

action

seeking

to

enforce

as

a binding

lease

agreement a one-page document entitled "Basic Lease Provisions"
that

did not

contain all of the basic

terms of

a lease

and

expressly contemplated that the parties would attempt to negotiate
a final lease for Brown's Shoe Fit Company to lease the premises
located at 340 Main Street, Park City, Utah from Defendant 330 Main
Street

Partners

("330

Partners").1

Brown's

sought

specific

performance or, in the alternative, damages. Brown's also asserted
a purported claim for fraud.

Defendants 33 0 Partners, Jon Olch,

Janet Olch and Henry Sigg filed a Counterclaim for abuse of process
and fraud.
The trial was scheduled for June 11, 1996.
1996,

On June 6,

a hearing was held before Judge Pat B. Brian to discuss the

issues that would be decided by the court and the issues that would
be decided by the jury.

[R. 1543] .

At that time, Judge Brian

determined to hold a hearing at the commencement of trial on June
11,

1996 to argue and decide various legal matters, including

whether Plaintiffs' claims should go to the jury or be decided by

The street address of the property was originally thought to be 330 Main Street. Hence the name
330 Main Street Partners.

3

the

court

and whether there were any disputed material

concerning those claims that had to be tried.
sides

understood

that

the

hearing

on

facts

[R. 1568-70] . Both

June

11,

1996

would

effectively be a summary judgment hearing. [R. 1558-70] .
At the commencement of trial on June 11, 1996, Judge Brian
held a hearing on the legal issues.

After substantial argument,

Judge Brian dismissed with prejudice Brown's specific performance
claim, its fraud claim and its claims for breach of contract to the
extent of the two three-year option periods referenced in the Basic
Lease Provisions.

Judge Brian reserved on the issue of whether the

Basic Lease Provisions was an enforceable agreement for the initial
three year term and ruled he would submit that issue to the jury.
[R. 1345, 1426].
After a recess, Brown's stipulated

that the breach of

contract claim for the initial three-year term of the lease could
also be dismissed with prejudice because it was Brown's position
that if it only had the initial three-year term of the lease it
would lose money.

Under the stipulation, if Brown's were to be

successful on this appeal in overturning Judge Brian's dismissal
of the breach of contract claim as to the option periods, Brown's
could refile the breach of contract claim as to the initial threeyear term.

[R. 1267-69].

Judge Brian also dismissed Defendants'

Counterclaim for abuse of process and fraud.
Thereafter,

in

October

and

November,

1996,

extensive

hearings were held on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
which

were

entered

by

the

court,

Dismissal, on December 12, 1996.

together

with

an

Order

of

Brown's filed a Notice of Appeal

4

on December 12, 1996.

33 0 Partners filed a Notice of Cross Appeal

of the court's dismissal of the abuse of process Counterclaim on
December 18, 1996.

B.

1.

[R. 1432, 1438],

Statement of Facts.

330 Partners is a general partnership organized and

existing under the laws of the State of Utah.

Defendants Jon Olch,

Janet Olch and Henry Sigg are partners in that partnership.

[R.

983-84] .
2.

Appellant Brown f s Shoe Fit Company is a purported

partnership organized to operate a shoe store in Park City, Utah.
[R. 1419] }
3.

Appellants

Tom Brown

and Brown's

purport to be two partners in the partnership.
4.

General

Offices

[R. 1419].

Prior to March, 1989, Tom Brown engaged in certain

preliminary discussions with Henry Sigg for Mr. Brown to lease the
Property from 330 Partners for the operation of a Brown's Shoe Fit
store.

[R. 250, 493].
5.

On March 18, 1984, Brown's Shoe Fit, Tom Brown and 330

Partners executed a document entitled "Basic Lease Provisions" (the
"BLP") setting forth certain terms the parties had agreed to as
part of the negotiations for a lease of the Property.

The BLP

provided for an initial three-year term and then two three-year

At the time the Basic Lease Provisions document was signed, Tom Brown and Brown's General Offices
intended to solicit certain third parties to become partners in the partnership, but no partners ever invested.
[R. 866-67, 8693.

5

option periods.

The BLP provided for a basic rent per square foot

and for a percentage rent based upon "gross volume."

The BLP

contained a square footage rate for the option periods, but did not
contain an agreed upon percentage rent for the option periods.
Instead,

the

BLP

specifically

provided

that

prior

to

the

commencement of each option period the parties would "agree on the
gross volume figure from which to base additional rent during each
year"

of

that

option

period.

[R.

67] .

Finally,

the

BLP

specifically provided that the terms agreed upon therein were "to
be

incorporated

parties."

into a final

lease document

executed

by both

[R. 67].

6.

Tom Brown's intent when he signed the BLP was "[t]o

firm up and have a written document reflecting the negotiations up
to this point."

Mr. Brown acknowledged that further negotiations

were contemplated and that he considered the BLP to be an agreement
to be incorporated into a future lease.
7.

[R. 874, 878-79].

On March 28, 1994, ten days after the BLP was signed,

Tom Brown sent a memo to prospective partners in the Park City
store in which he stated:
There is still a lot of things that have to be worked
out with the landlord, but it looks like it is going
to be a go.
Mr. Brown acknowledged that one of the things that had to be worked
out with the landlord was a final lease agreement.
8.

[R. 867-68].

The BLP contained conflicting provisions about whether

there would be a cost of living increase during the first option
period.

Moreover, the document did not provide which cost of

living index would apply during either option period.
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[R. 67].

9.

The BLP did not contain a lease commencement date.

[R.

67] .
10.

At the time the BLP was signed on March 18, 1994, no

building existed on the Property.

In fact, construction had not

even been commenced, no governmental approvals had been obtained
and final plans for the building had not been completed.
11.
completed

Architectural

until

plans

on or about

June

for

the

building

20, 1994.

[R. 791] .
were

The plans

not
were

submitted to the Park City Planning Staff on or about June 29,
1994.

A building permit application was filed September 23, 1994.

[R. 791].
12.

A construction contract for the construction of the

building was signed November 18, 1994.

Park City issued a ground

breaking permit on November 20, 1994, a footings and foundation
permit on December 19, 1994 and a full building permit on March 16,
1995.

[R. 791-92].
13.

Construction of the building on the Property commenced

in November, 1994.

Construction was completed in December, 1995,

a

after

full

21

months

the

BLP

was

executed.

A

Temporary

Certificate of Occupancy was issued on December 22, 1995.

[R.

792] .
14.
Brown,

On August 5, 1994, Jon Olch sent a letter to Tom

stating

his

position

that

the

BLP

was

not

a

binding

agreement, but indicating a willingness to attempt to work out an
agreeable lease with Brown's.
15.

[R. 882].

By letter dated August 12, 1994, Brown's attorney,

Thomas D. Green, wrote Jon Olch disagreeing that the BLP was not

7

a binding document, but indicating a willingness to work out a
lease agreement for the Property.
16.

[R.885].

During the fall of 1994 and early 1995, the parties

exchanged correspondence and drafts of lease agreements for the
Property, but no final lease agreement was ever agreed to by the
parties.

[R. 80-83, 45-66, 1-14].
17.

Defendants1

Brown's

attorney,

Thomas

Green,

reviewed

the

original proposed lease on behalf of Brown's.

By

letter dated October 27, 1994, he demanded over thirty changes in
the proposed lease.

Tom Brown testified that Brown's would not

sign the lease unless all of the changes demanded in that letter
were made.
18.

[R. 82, 39-44, 875].
The parties did not agree on a number of important

provisions to be included in the lease, including:
(a)
(b)
operation

The lease commencement date;
Whether
of

a

shoe

Brown's
store

should
on

the

be

limited

premises

or

to

the

whether

Brown's should be entitled to sell other clothing apparel;
(c)

Whether 330 Partners should be prohibited from

leasing other space in the building to a tenant selling the
same type of items;
(d)

What the definition of what "gross sales" should

be;
(e)

Whether

Brown's

should

be

prohibited

from

assigning or subletting the Property;
(f)

What

insurance

carry;

8

Brown's

should be

required

to

(g)

What the parties' rights would be in the event

of condemnation;
(h)

Whether Brown's should be required to put up a

letter of credit to secure one year's rent or whether
Brownf s should only be required to put up a two month
security deposit; and
(i)

What Brown's obligations would be in the event

of default.
19.

[R. 1-67].

Most importantly, as stated above, the parties did not

agree in the BLP on what the gross volume threshold for calculating
percentage rent during the option periods would be.

Despite the

fact that the BLP provided that the parties would agree on the
gross volume threshold prior to the commencement of each option
term, Brown's attempted to require 330 Partners to agree on that
threshold before Brown's would sign a lease.

On the other hand,

33 0 Partners

with

simply proposed

in accordance

the

specific

language of the BLP that the threshold would be agreed to prior to
commencement of the first and second option periods.

Brown's also

sought a provision designed to insure that the rent during the
option periods would not exceed then current fair rental value of
the Property.

33 0 Partners took the position that the rent during

the option periods would be higher to compensate it for the lower
than market rental rate during the initial term.

Brown's expert

conceded that is an appropriate goal for a landlord.

[R. 882-84,

887, 945-46, 947-952, 962-64] .
20.

Brown's was unwilling to lease the Property if all it

had was a binding agreement

for a three-year

9

lease.

Brown's

required

a

final

binding

agreement

for

two

periods in order to lease the Property.

three-year

[R. 925-27] .

option
At the

hearing at the commencement of trial on June 11, 1996, Brown's
stipulated that the following testimony of Tom Brown was true and
accurately reflected Brown's position:
Q. So I take it that at the end of the day you
were prepared to sign a lease if all the term was, was
three years, no options; is that true?
A. No.
Q.
In order to sign a lease you required at
least two option periods of three years each?
A. Yes.
Page 57, MR. VAN DAM: Go ahead.
Line 4, THE WITNESS: No, I wouldn't have done
it strictly on three years.
Q. (BY MR. BURBIDGE) I just ask, why not?
A. Because if you need to depreciate your items
and this sort of thing, you don't even get a run at
it in three years.
Q. So you would end up losing money?
A.
21.

Losing money.

[R. 1422].

Brown's conceded that many of the provisions on which

the parties disagreed were simply normal negotiating items upon
which the parties could reasonably take different positions.

[R.

917-44, 964-81].
22.

Brown's expert, Richard A. Robbins, opined that the

BLP was a typical letter of interest which parties use to attempt
to obtain financing and that 50% of the time such documents never
result in a final agreement between the parties.
23.

[R. 958-59, 961] .

On October 8, 1993, some months prior to execution of

the BLP, Tom Brown sent a letter to Henry Sigg indicating an
interest in leasing the Property.

Mr. Brown understood Sigg would

use that letter for financing purposes. No one told Mr. Brown that
330

Partners

financing.

would

not

use

the

[R. 876-77, 991].
10

BLP

to

assist

in

obtaining

V.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

The parties did not intend to be bound by the BLP,

which expressly provided that the terms set forth therein would be
incorporated in a final lease agreement.

Both parties intended

that unless and until a final lease was negotiated
agreement existed.
lease.

that no

The parties were unable to agree upon a final

Brown's attorney demanded over thirty changes in the

proposed lease submitted by 330 Partners.

Tom Brown testified he

would not sign a lease unless all of those changes were made.
2.

Regardless of the parties' intent, the BLP is not

enforceable because it is too uncertain and indefinite to be
enforced.
agree.

There are numerous terms to which the parties did not

Most importantly, the parties did not agree to the rent

during the two option terms. Under Utah law, the failure to agree
on such rent is fatal to any agreement.
3.

The BLP did not obligate 330 Partners to negotiate a

lease in good faith.

There is no such provision in the BLP nor

should such an agreement be implied by the court.
4.

Even if a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is

implied into the BLP, 330 Partners did, in fact, attempt to
negotiate a lease in good faith, but the parties were unable to
agree on a number of terms.

Brown's conceded that many of the

items were normal disagreements between a landlord and tenant.
5.

Brown's suffered no damages as a result of 330

Partners' alleged failure to negotiate in good faith. Brown's did
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not intend to perform the BLP.

Brownfs was only willing to lease

the Property if the rental for the two option periods was agreed
to in advance, an agreement which 33 0 Partners was not obligated
to make under the BLP.
6.

The trial court properly dismissed Brown's claims for

specific performance. The BLP was far too indefinite and uncertain
to be the subject of specific performance.

Further, Brown's did

not join the present tenants on the Property who were indispensable
parties.
7.
Offices1

The trial court correctly dismissed Brown f s General

claim to recover money it allegedly would have earned

under a management agreement with Brown's Shoe Fit.
special damage was not pled in the Complaint.

This item of

Nor was Brown's

General Offices a third party beneficiary of the BLP. And, Brown's
General Offices was not a party to the agreement, but was simply
a partner in Brown's Shoe Fit, which signed the BLP.
8.

The court properly determined that the facts set forth

in Finding No. 12 were undisputed based upon the record before the
court,

including

Complaint

and

the undisputed

the

deposition

documents

testimony

of

attached
Tom

to Brown's

Brown

and

his

attorney, Thomas Green.
9.

The court properly dismissed Brown's

fraud claim.

There was no misrepresentation of a presently existing fact because
there was no evidence that 33 0 Partners did not intend to attempt
to negotiate a final lease incorporating the terms of the BLP.
Further, because the terms of the BLP were so vague, uncertain and
incomplete, Brown's could not have reasonably relied upon that

12

document.

Brown's further could not have reasonably relied upon

the document because it did not intend to comply with its terms.
And, Brown's was not damaged by any supposed misrepresentation
because it did not intend to perform the BLP unless Brown's could
negotiate an agreement for the amount of rent to be paid during the
two option periods.

The BLP did not obligate 330 Partners to make

such

but

an

agreement,

only provided

that

the parties

would

negotiate the amount of rent during the option periods prior to
the commencement of each option period.
10.

The trial court erred in dismissing 330 Partners'

Counterclaim for abuse of process.

There was substantial evidence

that Brown's filed this action for damages or specific performance
with respect to the BLP knowing that Brown's would not perform the
BLP in order to attempt to exact a lease from 33 0 Partners to which
33 0 Partners was not obligated to agree or to force 330 Partners
to pay Brown's money to settle the lawsuit.

VI.
ARGUMENT

A.

THE BLP DID NOT CONSTITUTE A BINDING AGREEMENT, BUT WAS

SIMPLY PART OF THE PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND
IS TOO UNCERTAIN TO BE ENFORCED.

1.

The Parties Did Not Intend the BLP To Be a Binding

Lease.
Brown's attempted to elevate the BLP signed by Tom Brown
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and Henry Sigg on March 19, 1994 to the status of a binding lease
agreement between the parties.
a matter of law.

This assertion is without merit as

Not only is this position inconsistent with the

legal authorities, but it is inconsistent with the testimony of Tom
Brown and Brown's expert, Richard A. Robbins.
The cases are uniform that if the parties do not intend to
be bound

until

a

final

agreement

is prepared

agreement exists until that is accomplished.

and

signed,

no

See, e.a., Arnold

Palmer Golf Co. v. Fuqua Industries, Inc., 541 F.2d 584, 587 (6th
Cir. 1976); Itek Corporation v. Chicago Aerial Industries, Inc.,
248 A.2d 625, 629 (Del. 1968); Scheck v. Francis, 260 N.E.2d 493,
494 (N.Y. 1970).
This Court's decision in Crismon v. Western Co. of North
America, 742 P.2d 1219 (Utah App. 1987), is directly on point.

In

Crismon, the tenant sent a letter to the landlord dated January 11,
1982 confirming an agreement that the tenant would enter into a
lease agreement on five duplexes for a five-year term with lease
payments of $540.00 per unit per month with a 6% annual escalation
clause

and

that

the

landlord

would

be

maintenance and management of the units.

responsible

for

basic

The tenant stated that

its legal department would prepare a lease based upon the general
agreements the parties had reached.
Shortly thereafter, the tenant began paying rent on two
units, the construction of which had been completed.

The landlord

then wrote the tenant stating that the terms contained in the
tenant's letter were acceptable with certain modifications and
14

asking that the tenant respond to the proposed modifications so
that the parties could "proceed toward a final agreement."

The

parties then exchanged drafts of a final lease agreement, but never
agreed to all of the terms.
The trial court held that the tenant's January 11, 1982
letter did not constitute a binding commitment to lease, but simply
set forth the preliminary terms and that the landlord and tenant
had rejected each other's proposed lease.

This Court affirmed,

stating:
In this case, the language in Epps f January 11
letter
indicates that the parties were
still
negotiating. The letter states that Western's legal
department would be sending a prepared lease. That
statement indicates that both parties understood that
a binding contract would be entered into in the
future. Subsequent correspondence between the parties
also demonstrates that the January 11 letter evidenced
preliminary negotiations.
. . . Finally, the
subsequent leases exchanged by the parties demonstrate
that there was no meeting of the minds. Epps sent
Crismon a lease which Crismon rejected by sending back
a lease with different terms with regard to term,
rent, maintenance, insurance and default.
The
parties'
exchange
of
proposed
leases
clearly
demonstrates that they did not have a meeting of the
minds as to all of the essential terms of the lease.
[742 P.2d at 1222].
The facts of Crismon mirror those in the present case. The
BLP itself specifically states that the terms agreed upon therein
are "to be incorporated into a final lease document executed by
both parties."

The BLP does not come close to containing all of

the essential terms of a long-term commercial lease.

Tom Brown

testified his intent in signing the BLP was " [t]o firm up and have
a written document reflecting the negotiations up to this point."
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He acknowledged further negotiations were necessary. [R. 874, 87879] .

Ten days after the BLP was signed, Tom Brown told his

prospective partners that there were still a number of terms, that
had to be worked out with 33 0 Partners, but it looked like it
"would be a go."

[R. 867-68, 881].

The subsequent negotiations which took place between the
parties months later in which they could not agree on any number
of terms demonstrate the lack of an agreement.

Brown's attorney

in his October 27, 1994 demanded over thirty changes in the lease
proposed by 330 Partners.

And, Tom Brown very plainly testified

in his deposition that he would not sign the lease unless all of
the changes demanded in that letter were made.

[R. 82, 3 9-44,

875] .
There were a number of items the parties were not able to
agree upon in negotiations. Most importantly, there was absolutely
no agreement on the percentage rent which would be paid by Brovm' s
during the first and second option periods, nor was there any
mechanism

agreed

to for determining

that

rent.

Instead,

the

parties simply provided that prior to the commencement of each
option term, the parties would agree on the percentage rent for
that option term.

Tom Brown specifically testified that he would

not lease the Property unless he had a binding agreement to lease
for the two three-year option periods because otherwise he would
end up losing money.

[R. 1422] .

One of the demands made by

Brown f s attorney in the negotiations was that, contrary to the
specific provisions of the BLP, 33 0 Partners agree in advance as
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part of the initial lease what the percentage rent would be during
the option periods or agree that if the parties could not agree on
the rent it would be established by appraisers.

Brown's attorney

testified that unless that item was agreed to, he would not
recommend his clients sign a lease.

The attorney acknowledged

there was no provision in the BLP obligating 330 Partners to agree
on the percentage rent during the option periods.

[R. 925-27].

Other terms the parties were unable to agree upon as part
of the lease negotiations included the lease commencement date,
what business Brown's would be entitled to conduct on the Property,
whether other tenants would be prohibited from selling similar
items as sold by Brown's, whether Brown's could only conduct a shoe
store or could sell other clothing items, whether there would be
costs of living escalations during the first option term, which
cost of living index would be utilized to calculate cost of living
increases, the definition of "gross sales" from which percentage
rent would be calculated, the amount of insurance which would be
required, Brown's right to assign or sublease, the rights of the
parties in case of the exercise of eminent domain rights, and
Brown's obligations in case of default.
It is patently obvious from the foregoing facts, including
Brown's own testimony, that the parties did not intend to be bound
by the BLP unless and until they reached a final, binding lease

17

agreement containing numerous additional terms.3

Indeed, Richard

R. Robbins, the expert retained by Brown's, testified that the BLP
was a typical letter of intent which parties use to attempt to
obtain financing and that 50% of the time such documents never
result in a final agreement between the parties.

2.

[R. 958-59, 961].

Regardless of the Parties' Intent, the BLP Is Not an

Enforceable Lease.

The lease contemplated by the parties was for a period of
more than one year.

Therefore, the lease was required to be in

writing under the statute of frauds.
1.

Utah Code Annotated § 25-5-

In order for a memorandum to satisfy the statute of frauds, it

must contain all of the essential provisions and terms of the
agreement.

English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P. 2d 613, 616

(Utah App. 1991) .

To be enforced, the memorandum must also set

forth the obligations of the parties with sufficient definiteness.
Southlands Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320, 322 (Utah App. 1988).

Brown's argues that when Judge Noel denied 330 Partners' Motion for Summary Judgment prior to the
completion of discovery, he "explicitly ruled the parties' intended 'to be bound' by the" BLP. [Appellants
Brief, p. 14, n.3]. Brown's concludes without any support whatsoever that this establishes the law of the case.
This contention is wrong. Initially, Brown's relies for this contention solely upon the contents of an unsigned
minute entry prepared by the clerk. Neither the proposed order prepared by 330 Partners, nor the proposed order
prepared by Brown's contains such a ruling. The court did not sign either order. Thus, no such ruling exists.
See. South Salt Lake v. Burton. 718 P.2d 405 (Utah 1986); State v. Rawlings. 829 P.2d 150, 153 (Utah App. 1992).
Moreover, a determination made by one judge denying a motion for summary judgment does not establish the law
of the case prohibiting a second judge from revising the prior ruling. AMS Salt Industries. Inc. v. Magnesium
Corp. of America. 320 Utah Ad. Rep. 3, 4 (Filed June 24, 1997); Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies. 884 P.2d 1306,
1311 (Utah App. 1994). And, the denial of a motion without findings or a statement of grounds does not
establish law of the case. Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen. 801 P.2d 163, 167-68 (Utah App. 1990). In
point of fact, significant discovery followed the initial motion for summary judgment, and Judge Brian was
presented with a substantially different record.
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Even if it is assumed for purposes of argument, contrary
to what is demonstrated above, that the parties intended the BLP
to be a binding lease, that document is unenforceable as a matter
of law at the very least because it does not contain a lease
commencement date and, more importantly, an agreement on the amount
of rent to be paid during the first and second option periods.
First, there is no lease commencement date set forth in the
BLP nor is there any method set to determine when the lease would
commence. There is not even any provision obligating 330 Partners
to complete construction of the building at any specified date.
Certainly, if Brownfs Shoe were on the other foot, it would argue
that it could not be bound to a lease for a non-existent building
to commence some unspecified time in the future after the landlord
prepared plans for a building, obtained governmental approvals and
actually completed construction.
Second, as previously explained, the BLP did not specify
the percentage rental that Brown's would be obligated to pay during
the option periods or any mechanism for determining the percentage
rental.

Thus, the rent that Brown's would pay during the option

periods was left for future agreement.

At most, the BLP was an

agreement to agree in the future.
Utah law is settled beyond dispute that an option to renew
a lease is unenforceable unless the rent to be paid, or some
mechanism for determining the amount of rent, is specified in the
lease.

Thus, in Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558

P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976), the lessee had an option to renew a lease
19

at a rate to be determined based upon specific factors.

The

parties were not able to agree on the amount of rent for the option
period.

The Utah Supreme Court held that because there was no

agreement between the parties on the rental rate for the renewal
term, the lease terminated, explaining:
The majority rule, in essence, is that a
provision for the extension or renewal of a lease must
specify the time the lease is to extend and the rate
of rent to be paid with such a degree of certainty and
definiteness that nothing is left to future
determination. If it falls short of this requirement,
it is not enforceable. . . .
In the current matter, the court implied the
parties had agreed on a reasonable rental figure,
which the court proceeded to determine.
This
interpretation had the effect of nullifying the
express factors specified by the parties, and
substituting a new agreement to which the parties had
not committed themselves. To attempt by judicial fiat
to substitute the legal concept of "reasonable rental"
in lieu of the previously followed design of a
fluctuating rental, measured by future uncontrolled
and uncontrollable conditions, would, indeed, be to
remake the contract for the parties and very possibly
frustrate what to us appears to be a very important
contrary intent concerning the rental a m o u n t . . . .
The option to renew was too vague and indefinite to
be enforceable and the lease terminated by its own
terms as of September 30, 1974. [Emphasis added].
[558 P.2d at 1321].
Brown's attempts to distinguish Pingree on the basis that
Brown's would have presented evidence of a later oral agreement
made after the BLP was signed that rent during the option terms
would be based on fair market value. There was no such contention
made by Brown's until months after its claims were dismissed when
the parties were arguing over the findings.
evidence to support this contention.
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Nor was there any

In fact, 33 0 Partners'

position was that it was entitled to charge higher rent during the
option periods to offset the less than market rent during the
initial three-year term.

[R. 883] . Moreover, the purported oral

agreement would be barred by the statute of frauds.
Finally, this purported distinction was rejected by the
Utah Supreme Court in the later case of Cottonwood Mall Co. v.
Sine, 767 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988).

In Cottonwood Mall, the tenant

attempted to enforce an alleged oral agreement by the landlord to
renew a lease "upon reasonable terms."

The Utah Supreme Court

refused to do so, and held that the oral agreement on renewal was
unenforceable, stating:
We held [in JPingree] that the option to renew was too
vague and indefinite to be enforceable and that the
lease terminated at the end of the original term.
In so ruling, this court followed what was
termed the majority rule . . . which was stated to be
that a provision for the extension or renewal of a
lease must specify the time the lease is to extend and
the rate of rent to be paid with such a degree of
certainty and definiteness that nothing is left to
future determination.
If it falls short of this
requirement, it is not enforceable. . . .
In
reversing the trial court, this Court expressly
rejected its attempt to fix a reasonable rent for the
parties when their negotiations bogged down.
Defendant would have us now do what we refused
to do in Pingree. While it is true that defendant
adduced evidence as to what would be a reasonable
renewal term and what would be a reasonable rent, the
trial court properly spurned defendants invitation
to find or make an agreement where the parties had
themselves failed. Defendants argue that in Pingree
the court declined to fix a renewal rent because of
the difficulty in balancing the several factors which
the lease required the parties to consider in fixing
the rent. Here, defendant's argument continues, no
factors are listed in the lease, and the task is less
complicated. We do not agree. In determining what
is "reasonable rent," many factors must be weighed
and put into the equation. Business judgments must
be made. . . . Courts simply are not equipped to make
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monetary decisions impacted by the fluctuating
commercial world and are even less prepared to impose
paternalistic agreements on litigants.
[767 P.2d at 502].
In the recent case of Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v.
Tsern, 928 P.2d 368 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed
continued vitality of the principles
Cottonwood Mall.

set forth in Pinaree and

In Tsern, the parties to a lease traded proposals

for a rent abatement because an elevator in the leased premises was
inoperable.

The trial court found that although the parties had

not agreed on the amount of an abatement, it could fix a reasonable
amount because
abatement.

the parties had agreed to the concept of rent

The Supreme Court reversed, stating:

Tsern argues that the trial court erred in
supplying
a
requisite
term
of
the
proposed
modification. We agree. . . . The only issue, given
the trial court's findings, is whether the parties
agreed on each of the necessary elements of a valid
modification. We hold that they did not.
Courts may not impose a modification of a lease
to which the parties have not agreed and, a fortiori,
may not do so when the parties have explicitly
disagreed as to the essential terms thereof. A valid
modification of a contract or lease requires "a
meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be
spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with
sufficient definiteness." Modification of such terms
as the amount of rent must be agreed upon in a
modification of a lease agreement. As Corbin notes,
when parties have not agreed on a reasonable price or
a method for determining one, "the agreement is too
indefinite and uncertain for enforcement." .
Barton and Tsern did not agree as to the amount of the
abatement, either expressly or impliedly.
[928 P.2d at 373-74] [Citations omitted] [Emphasis added].
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held agreements to
agree unenforceable in other contexts besides leases.
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Thus, in

Harmon v. Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636, 639

(Utah 1979), the Court

stated:
The Letter of Intent quoted above is not by
itself an enforceable contract. Nowhere in its forms
are any binding promises even made; it is precisely
what it purports to be, a letter indicating the
intention of the parties to enter into, at a later
time, a binding agreement. The letter is a variation
of what is often called a "agreement to agree". Such
"agreements to agree" are generally unenforceable
because they leave open material terms for future
consideration and the courts cannot create these terms
for the parties. Here the parties simply committed
themselves to the intention of entering into an
agreement at a later time. The letter set out certain
goals of that later agreement, including the formation
of a corporation.
But the letter itself is not a
binding agreement to create any business entity
jointly owned by the parties, and indeed, even if it
could be so construed, it is woefully lacking in the
requisite
specificity
required
for
judicial
enforcement. As we stated in Valcarce, " . . . where
there was simply some nebulous notion in the air that
a contract might be entered in the future, the court
cannot fabricate the kind of contract the parties
ought to have made and enforce it." [Emphasis added] .
See also. Oil Shale Corporation v. Larson, 438 P.2d 540-541 (Utah
1968); Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (Utah 1961).
Brown's cites a number of cases to attempt to escape these
controlling decisions of the Utah Supreme Court.

None of Brown ! s

cases are on point.
For example, Brown's cites Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P. 2d 857
(Utah 1979).

In that case, plaintiff had orally agreed to purchase

a house for the defendant and sell it to her within a few months
for $6,500.00 plus a "fair commission."
oral agreement had been made.

Plaintiff admitted the

The Court held this agreement was

enforceable because the purchase price for the house was definitely
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stated to be $6,500.00 and where the "main subject matter of a
contract

is

definite,

an

agreement

for

fixing

reasonable

compensation for some adjunctive service in connection therewith
does not render the contract so indefinite as to be unenforceable."
[595 P. 2d 859] .

The Court held the plaintiff had breached the

agreement by refusing to even state to defendant what he would
accept as a fair commission.

Ferris did not involve either a lease

or the enforceability of a renewal provision.

The case was also

decided several years before the Utah Supreme Court's decision in
Cottonwood

Mall,

in

which

the

Supreme

Court

again

made

it

abundantly clear that a court will not determine for the parties
a reasonable rental rate during a renewal period.

In addition,

unlike Ferris, there was no agreement in the case at bar that the
rental

rate

during

the

renewal

period

would

be

"fair"

or

"reasonable."
Brown's also mistakenly relies on Reed v. Alvev, 610 P.2d
1374

(Utah 1980) .

In that case, the parties entered into an

earnest money agreement for the sale of real estate for the sum of
$70,000.00, which would be payable "upon terms to be arranged."
The court held that this agreement was enforceable because where
there are no terms of payment set forth in the agreement, the law
supplies the missing term by implying that the payment is due in
full at the time of tender of the conveyance.

[610 P.2d at 1378-

79] .
In Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427 (Utah 1980), cited by
Brown's, the parties entered into a written earnest money agreement
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for the purchase by plaintiff on one unimproved lot for $30,000.00
and for an option on an adjacent lot.

Plaintiff made a $100.00

down payment and tendered a cashier's check for the balance of
$29,900.00.

The defendant refused to sell.

The Supreme Court

merely held that the contract was enforceable because it was
definite and certain in its essential terms.
Incredibly, Brown's next contends that Pingree no longer
reflects current law because it referred in its decision to a
majority rule about "agreements to agree" and therefore the Utah
Supreme Court's decision in Cottonwood Mall and Tsern, which
"uncritically cited Pingree without considering new laws and legal
doctrines" should be ignored by this Court.

This argument is

fatuous.
The Utah Supreme Court in its decision in Pingree did not
blindly follow any "majority rule." It reached its decision based
upon a well-reasoned analysis of the applicable law and policy
considerations. The same is true of the Supreme Court's decisions
in Cottonwood Mall and Tsern.

The Supreme Court's 1996 decision

in Tsern readopting the very same legal analysis and principles as
adopted in Pingree, Cottonwood Mall and other earlier decisions
lays bare Brown's argument that the Supreme Court's prior decisions
rejecting Brown's position should be ignored.
Brown's assertion that the majority of courts now enforce
agreements to agree is wrong. While there certainly is a split of
authority on this issue and a number of cases have enforced
agreements to agree based upon the particular facts of those cases
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(usually where the parties have agreed to a "reasonable rent").
That is not a

"majority rule."

Most courts flatly refuse to

enforce such agreements or refuse to enforce them unless there is
a mechanism for determining the rent.
696,

697-98

(Mont.

1980);

Joseph

See, Riis v. Day, 613 P.2d
Martin

Jr.

Deli,

Inc.

v.

Schumacher, 419 N.Y.S.2d 558, 559 (1979); Farnsworth on Contracts,
§ 3.29 at p. 219 (2d Ed. 1990).
Brown 1 s

argues

that

Utah

appellate

courts

"routinely

enforce 'agreements to agree,1" ignoring the consistent decisions
to the contrary.

[Appellants' Brief, p. 23].

correct if it added the word "not."

Brown's would be

The authorities cited by

Brown's for the proposition that this court can enforce the BLP do
not support that position at all.
Brown's miscites English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P. 2d
613 (Utah App. 1991) . English has nothing to do with the issue in
the present case.
due under

In English, the parties orally modified the rent

a written

lease which provided

negotiated every thirty-six months.

the rent was

to be

The tenant then actually paid

the modified rent for a few months. The landlord admitted the oral
agreement, but contended the oral agreement was unenforceable under
the statute of frauds. This Court held only that the written lease
agreement, together with rental checks that were accepted by the
landlord,

and

the

correspondence

concerning

the

matter,

sufficient writings to satisfy the statute of frauds.

were

This Court

distinguished Pinaree and Cottonwood Mall on the basis that the
statute of frauds was not an issue in those cases.
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Brown's

reliance

on this Courtfs

decision

in Republic

Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285 (Utah App. 1994), is
similarly unavailing.
agreement

to

defendant's

pay

a

company

In Republic, this Court
reasonable

fee

stock

enforceable

was

for

the

held

that

the

of

all

the

light

of

the

sale
in

relationship between the parties, the fact that they had already
agreed to a $250,000.00 commission if 22% of the stock was sold and
because

they

had

also

sometime

later

agreed

upon

a

fee

of

$450,000.00 if all the stock was sold to a party for approximately
$35,000,000.00.

This Court distinguished Pinaree upon the basis

that in Pinaree the parties had not agreed to a "reasonable11 rent.
Moreover, to the extent Brown's attempts to interpret Republic as
allowing this Court to set a "reasonable" rent, Republic would
directly contradict the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Cottonwood
Mall where the Utah Supreme Court refused to enforce an agreement
for the payment of "reasonable" rent in order to renew a lease.
In Kier v. Condrack, 478 P.2d 327 (Utah 1970), cited by
Brown's,

the plaintiffs were given an option

to purchase

the

seller's home for the sum of $23,500.00 "on payments and terms to
be negotiated."

When the buyer exercised the option, he offered

to cash out the plaintiffs by paying their equity and assuming the
balance on two mortgages.
cash.

Thus, the effect of the offer was to pay

The sellers rejected the offer, made it clear that they

would not take cash, and attempted to bargain for a higher price
by inserting into the agreement a provision that they would retain
occupancy of the house for one to two years.
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Finally, Brown's attempt to rely on Valley Lane Corp, v.
Bowen, 592 P.2d 589 (Utah 1979), is curious.

In Valley Lane, the

parties agreed that if they were unable to agree on renewal rent,
the rent would be determined by appraisers based on fair market
value.

Thus, the parties agreed to a specific procedure by which

the rent would be determined -- something that is entirely lacking
in the BLP, but was many months later proposed by Brown's and
rejected by 330 Partners.4

B.

THE COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED BROWN'S CLAIM TO SPECIFIC

PERFORMANCE.

A claim for specific performance is equitable in nature and
is to be decided by the court.

Judge Brian determined as a matter

of law that the BLP was too vague and indefinite for him to order
specific

performance.

He

further

refused

to

order

specific

performance on the basis that the tenants occupying the Property
had not been joined as parties.

[R. 1424].

Judge Brian's decision

was entirely correct.

Brown's also asks this Court to borrow from the provisions of Section 78A-2-305 of the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code which provides that under certain conditions a court can determine a reasonable price for the
sale of goods where the parties are unable to agree on the price. However, as Brown's concedes, the Uniform
Commercial Code has absolutely no applicability to a lease of real estate. There is no basis for this court
to "analogize" the provision of the UCC to a real estate lease, especially in view of the repeated decisions
of the Utah Supreme Court specifically rejecting Brown's position that this Court can set reasonable rent
during the option periods.
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1.

As a Matter of Law the BLP Was Too Indefinite.

The legal principle that the terms of an agreement must be
clear, definite and certain set forth above applies with special
force when the extraordinary relief of specific performance is
sought.

Candid Productions v. International Skating Union, 53 0

F.Supp. 1330 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
491,

493

(Utah

1967),

In Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 423 P.2d

the Utah

Supreme

Court

set

forth

the

following requirements for specific performance:
The contract must be free from doubt, vagueness,
and ambiguity, so as to leave nothing to conjecture
or to be supplied by the court.
It must be
sufficiently certain and definite in its terms to
leave no reasonable doubt as to what the parties
intended and no reasonable doubt of the specific thing
equity is called upon to have performed, and it must
be sufficiently certain as to its terms so that the
court may enforce it as actually made by the parties.
A greater degree of certainty is required for specific
performance in equity than is necessary to establish
a contract as the basis of an action at law for
damages. [Emphasis added].
See also. Southlands Corp. v Potter, 760 P.2d 320, 322 (Utah App.
1988); Eckard v. Smith, 527 F.2d 660, 662 (Utah 1974) ("specific
performance cannot be granted unless the terms are clear, and that
clarity must be found from the language used in the document.");
Barnard v. Barnard, 700 P.2d 1113, 1114 (Utah 1985); Pitcher v.
Lauritzen, 423 P.2d 491, 493 (Utah 1967).
Because the BLP did not specify the rental during the
option periods, did not specify the lease commencement date and did
not contain an agreement on all of the other terms discussed above
customarily found in a long-term commercial lease upon which the
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parties were eventually unable to agree, the court!s decision to
dismiss the specific performance claim was entirely correct.
Brown's cites the court to Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining
Co., 242 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah 1952), as proof that the agreement in
the present case is definite enough to be specifically enforced.
Birdzell, however, directly refutes Brown's position. In Birdzell,
the court ruled the purported agreement was not definite enough to
be enforced because the letter relied upon as the agreement:
. . . does not state what amount the rent shall
be but expressly leaves that question open for further
negotiations. In an oral contract to execute a lease
for a period longer than one year, the amount of rent
is clearly one of the essential terms which must
appear in a memorandum.
[242 P.2d at 580].
Nor does Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d
support Brown's position.

597

(Utah

1962),

In Bunnell, the Court simply held that

the parties had indeed reached agreement on all the terms of the
contract.
Brown's

asserts

that

it was error for Judge Brian to

dismiss its equitable claim for specific performance before the
jury ruled on Brown's legal claim for damages based on common
facts.

[Appellants' Brief, p. 46] . Brown's mistakenly argues that

because Judge Brian was going to allow the issue of whether the BLP
was enforceable with respect to the initial three-year term of the
lease to go to the jury before he decided as a matter of law
whether the BLP was sufficient for recovery of damages, that Judge
Brian was obligated not to decide the specific performance claim
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until the jury made its determination.

This argument is wrong for

two reasons.
First, as the cases cited above demonstrate, an agreement
may be definite enough for the recovery of damages, but still too
indefinite for specific performance.

Thus, any decision the jury

would make on damages would not be binding with respect to specific
performance.

It was purely a question of law for the court to

decide whether the BLP was definite enough to justify specific
performance.

The interpretation of an unambiguous agreement is a

question of law for the court to decide.

The threshold question

of whether a contract is ambiguous is also a question of law for
the court.

Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 559

(Utah App. 1994).

Even if a contract is ambiguous, the resolution of the ambiguity
presents a question of law for the court, unless contradictory
evidence is presented to clarify the ambiguity.

Morris v. Mountain

States Tel & Tel Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1200-01 (Utah 1983); Overson
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty, 587 P.2d

149, 151

(Utah

1978) .
There was no claim in the case at bar or tender of any
evidence that the BLP was ambiguous, nor was any evidence tendered
of

any

negotiations

ambiguities.

or

discussions

to

clarify

any

purported

Therefore, the interpretation of the BLP was purely

a question of law for the court to decide. The court appropriately
made that decision.
Second, this argument is moot because Brown's stipulated
to the dismissal of its claim for damages for breach of the BLP.
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Thus, t h e r e were no "common facts" to be decided by the j u r y a t
trial.

2.

The Tenants Were Indispensable P a r t i e s .

Brown's contention t h a t the court erred in refusing

to

grant s p e c i f i c performance because of Brown's f a i l u r e to j o i n the
present t e n a n t s on the Property i s likewise without m e r i t . 5

In

McLean v. Archer, 201 P.2d 184, 189-90 (Wash. 1948), the court
recognized the long-standing r u l e t h a t p a r t i e s whose r i g h t s w i l l
be d i r e c t l y affected by a decree of s p e c i f i c performance must be
joined as p a r t i e s i f they are subject to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the
court.

The court s t a t e d :
The fundamental rule t h a t a l l persons whose
r i g h t s w i l l be d i r e c t l y affected by a decree in equity
must, if within the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the court and
l e g a l l y capable of suing or being sued, be joined as
p a r t i e s p l a i n t i f f or defendant in order t h a t complete
j u s t i c e may be done and that there may be a f i n a l
determination of the r i g h t s of a l l p a r t i e s i n t e r e s t e d
in the subject matter of the controversy governs the
questions
of
parties
in
suits
for
specific
performance.

See a l s o . Wilson v. Thomason, 406 So.2d 871, 872 (Ala. 1981) ; Savin
v. Rauch, 255 P.2d 206, 209 (Wyo. 1953); Beck v. Adams, 174 P.2d
134, 137-38 (Wyo. 1946); A. P. Freund Sons v. Vaupll, 202 N.E.2d

Although Brown's starts out i t s specific performance argument by acknowledging that one of the
reasons the court dismissed the claim was that the BLP was too uncertain and indefinite to be enforceable.
Brown's later inconsistently t e l l s the court that Judge Brian only dismissed the specific performance claim
because of the non-joinder of the tenants.
[Appellants* Brief, p. 21]. Brown's disingenuously relies on a
single excerpt from the June 11, 1996 hearing in which Judge Brian was exploring what to do with the specific
performance claim.
Judge Brian later made clear on the record of that hearing and in his Findings and
Conclusions that the specific performance claim was dismissed, f i r s t , because i t was too indefinite and
uncertain, and, second, because of the non-joinder of the tenants. [R. 1294-96, 1424].
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350, 352 (111. 1964).

See also, 81AC.J.S. Specific Performance.

§ 136.
The only case cited by Brown's in support of its argument
that the tenants were not indispensable parties

is Helzberg's

Diamond Shops, Inc. v. Valley West Pes Moines Shopping Center,
Inc. , 546

F.2d

distinguished.

816

(8th

Cir.

1977) .

Helzberg's

not

subject

easily

There, the Court recognized that the tenant was

required to be joined as a party if possible.
was

is

to

the

personal

However, the tenant

jurisdiction

of

the

court.

Furthermore, the trial court had afforded the tenant an opportunity
to intervene in the action to protect its interests.

It was in

that context that the Eighth Circuit held the district court had
not committed error in proceeding in the absence of the tenant.
Brown's also argues that any dismissal for non-joinder
should have been without prejudice.

If Brown's contention is

correct, then Brown's could have forced 33 0 Partners to go to trial
on the damage claims and then have to come back for a second trial
at a later time on the claim for specific performance.

In this

regard, Brown's did not seek leave to bring in the tenants as
parties.
The only case cited by Brown's for its argument that the
dismissal should have been without prejudice involved far different
facts.

In

Bonneville

Tower

Condominium

Thompson Michie Assocs., 728 P.2d

1017

Management
(Utah 1986),

Comm.

v.

cited by

Brown's, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for
failure to join indispensable parties. The court ordered plaintiff
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to

amend

its

complaint

to

add

the

indispensable

parties

as

defendants on two occasions and indicated that if the parties were
not joined, the case would be dismissed.

Plaintiff elected to

stand on its complaint and the trial court then dismissed the
action with prejudice.

The dismissal was entered at the outset of

the case, not at trial, as in the present case.

C.

THE BLP DID NOT OBLIGATE 33 0 PARTNERS TO NEGOTIATE A

LEASE IN GOOD FAITH.

Brown's contends that even if the BLP was not a binding
lease, the document somehow gave rise to a covenant of good faith
and fair dealing obligating Defendants to negotiate a lease in good
faith.

In other words, Brown's contends that the BLP was not an

implied agreement to agree, but an implied agreement to negotiate!
There is no basis for the implication of such a covenant.
In order for a covenant of good faith and fair dealing to
exist,

there

must

be

a

contractual

relationship

between

the

parties.

Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 921 (Utah 1993) .

covenant

of good

faith cannot

create an agreement

where

A

none

existed or supply terms to which the parties have not assented.
Atchison Casting Corp. v. Dofasco, Inc., 889 F.Supp. 1445, 1457
(D.Kan. 1995) .

The courts have routinely held that unless and

until a final agreement is reached, parties are free to break off
negotiations at any time even if they have previously agreed to
some of the terms of an agreement.
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See, e.g., Gasmark Ltd. v.

Kimball Energy Corp., 868 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Tex. App. 1994); McGinn
v. American Bank Stationary Co., 195 A.2d 615, 616 (Mary. 1963) .
Thus, in Trustee's of the First Pres. Church v. Howard Co.
Jewelers, 97 A.2d 144, 146 (N.J. 1953), the court stated:
It is a well-established principle of contract
law that . . . until the actual completion of the
bargain, either party is at liberty to withdraw his
consent and put an end to the negotiation. . . .
From all the circumstances it seems reasonably
clear that both parties considered that many terms
remained to be agreed upon despite the fact that the
basic terms, the length of the lease and the amount
of rent, had been definitely settled. It is common
experience that the lease of a valuable piece of
property such as this is never based solely upon the
length of the term or rental alone, and until there
is an agreement as to the other essential terms
usually found in such a lease and ordinarily
formalized in the writing, no binding contract exists.
In the case at bar, there is no express provision in the
BLP whereby the parties obligated themselves to negotiate a lease
in good faith.
into

the

Brown's wants this court to imply such a provision

document

simply

because

the

parties

had

reached

preliminary understanding on a few of the terms of the lease.
case law does not support such an implication.

a

The

Indeed, even if the

parties had agreed to negotiate in good faith, such an agreement
would have been too vague and indefinite to be enforced.

In Candid

Productions v. International Skating Union, 530 F.Supp. 1330, 1336
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), the court granted summary judgment dismissing a
claim that the defendant had breached an express agreement

to

negotiate in good faith because that agreement was too vague and
indefinite to be enforced, observing:
While the power of the Court to fashion in
appropriate case an equitable remedy is great, it does
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not encompass the right to make an agreement for the
parties. To issue a decree of specific performance,
as plaintiff requests, would require the Court to
enter into the realm of the conjectural. An agreement
to negotiate in good faith is even more vague than an
agreement to agree. An agreement to negotiate in good
faith is amorphous and nebulous, since it implicates
so many factors that are themselves indefinite and
uncertain that the intent of the parties can only be
fathomed by conjecture and surmise.
In Reprosystem B.V. v. SCM Corp., 727 F.2d 257 (2nd Cir.
1984),

the

Second

Circuit

negotiate in good faith.

refused

to

imply

an obligation

to

The Second Circuit held that because the

parties did not intend to be bound to an agreement unless and until
a formal written agreement was signed, there was no agreement
between the parties and thus no obligation to negotiate a final
agreement in good faith. The court stated that:
agreement

that

existed

was

too

indefinite"

"Whatever implied
for

the

court

to

were

to

imply

an

enforce.
In
obligation
obligated

the

at

to negotiate

bar,

if

in good

to start negotiations

several months)?
Partners

case

the

court

faith, when were

the parties

(they did not even do so for

How long would Brown's have to wait for 330

to

complete

governmental

approvals

the

plans

for

the

building,

for the building, obtain

obtain

financing

for

construction and obtain a construction contract so that Brown's
would have a reasonable idea of when the building would be finished
before Brown's was freed of its obligation to negotiate and free
to pursue other properties?

How long would negotiations have to

last; would the parties have to agree on reasonable terms with
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respect to all of the matters that had not been agreed upon, or
were the parties free to negotiate whatever terms they could, as
in normal

contract

negotiations?

Were the parties

free to

negotiate more favorable terms on certain provisions to compensate
for concessions made on other provisions in the lease?

These and

many other similar questions counsel against the implication of an
implied covenant to negotiate in good faith in the present case.
Brown's relies upon Channel Home Centers v. Grossman, 795
F.2d 291 (3rd Cir. 1986), to support its claim that 330 Partners
was obligated to negotiate the remaining lease terms in good faith.
Grossman is, however, distinguishable because in that case the
landlord unambiguously agreed in writing to "withdraw the store
from the rental market and only negotiate the above-described
leasing transaction to completion."

The court held that this

constituted an enforceable express obligation to negotiate in good
faith and therefore the landlord's failure to negotiate and his
entering into a lease with a third party constituted a breach of
that obligation.
Brown's once again cites Kier v. Condrack, supra, for its
good faith argument, arguing that it establishes "an extraordinary
duty to negotiate missing terms in agreements in good faith." Kier
does no such thing.

Kier only establishes that if a buyer has an

option to purchase property for a specific sum "on payments and
terms to be negotiated, " the seller cannot refuse to sell just
because he has decided not to when the buyer is willing to pay the
entire option price in cash.
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Most importantly, Brown's good faith argument flies in the
face of the Utah Supreme Court's decisions in Pingree, Cottonwood
Mall and Tsern that a court will not imply a reasonable rental rate
to renew or modify leases.

And, contrary to Brown's argument,

there is no indication in Pingree, Cottonwood Mall or Tsern that
the parties had already engaged in good faith negotiations.

D.

330 PARTNERS DID ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE A LEASE IN GOOD

FAITH.

Even were the Court to rule on some basis that 33 0 Partners
had an obligation to negotiate in good faith for a final lease, the
evidence demonstrates that 33 0 Partners did so.
It was undisputed that all of the negotiations between the
parties for a lease were in writing.

Those negotiations took place

during the latter part of 1994 and early 1995.
submitted a proposed lease to Brown's.

330 Partners

Brown's attorney, Thomas

Green, then wrote his October 27, 1994 letter demanding over thirty
changes in the lease.

330 Partners agreed to some of the changes,

but refused others. Then, in the spring of 1995, Brown's submitted
a proposed lease to 330 Partners. However, the parties were unable
to agree on the terms of the lease and negotiations terminated.
Brown's conceded that many of these items were normal disagreements
between a landlord and tenant.

[R. 917-44, 964-81].

Brown's contention that 330 Partners did not negotiate in
good faith is based upon nothing more than the fact that 33 0
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Partners did not consider the BLP to be binding and that 33 0
Partners wanted the BLP signed for financing purposes.

Brown's

expert testified, however, that is the normal purpose for such a
document and that 50% of the time such documents don't result in
a final agreement between the parties.

E.

[R. 958-59, 961].

AS A MATTER OF LAW, BROWN'S SUFFERED NO DAMAGES AS A

RESULT OF DEFENDANTS' ALLEGED FAILURE TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH.

In addition to the fact that no implied obligation to
negotiate in good faith existed, Defendants were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on the good faith and fair dealing
claim because, even if it is assumed for argument that Defendants
were obligated to negotiate a lease in good faith and failed to do
so, Brown's suffered no damage from that failure as a matter of
law.
As set forth above, Brown's specifically stipulated at
trial that Tom Brown's testimony that he would not have agreed to
lease the Property for only three years and that he required a
lease of at least two option periods of three years each was true
testimony and accurately stated Brown's position in this lawsuit.
Based upon that stipulation, Brown's moved for a dismissal of its
claim for breach of the BLP for the initial three-year term.

[R.

1267-1269] . Moreover, once again, Tom Brown testified that Brown's
would not have entered into a lease unless 33 0 Partners agreed to
all of the more than thirty changes demanded by Brown's counsel in
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October, 1994, including a provision that set the percentage rental
during the option periods.

Brown's thus was unwilling to comply

with the specific provision of the BLP which only obligated 330
Partners to agree on the rent in the option periods prior to the
commencement of each option period.
Accordingly, even if 33 0 Partners would have acceded to
every demand made by Brown's except the demand to agree in advance
to the rental to be paid during the option periods, which 33 0
Partners was plainly not obligated to do, Brown's would not have
entered into a lease.

Simply put, Brown's itself was not willing

to live with the BLP.

Therefore, any supposed failure of 33 0

Partners to negotiate in good faith caused Brown's no damage.

F.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED BROWN'S GENERAL

OFFICES CLAIMS TO RECOVER MONEY THAT IT ALLEGEDLY WOULD HAVE EARNED
UNDER A SERVICES AGREEMENT WITH THE PARTNERSHIP TENANT.

The trial court correctly found that:
15.
Brown's General Offices was not a named
signatory to the Basic Lease Provisions document, was
not intended to be named signatory to any final lease
agreement, if any could be reached, nor was it to be
a tenant in the subject building.
[R. 1422].
Brown's has not challenged that finding.

Based on this

finding, the court determined that as a matter of law Brown's
General Offices' claim (asserted for the first time in a damage
study

prepared

and

served

shortly

before

trial)

that

it

was

entitled to recover damages based upon a management agreement it
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allegedly would have entered into with the proposed tenant, the
Brown's Shoe Fit partnership, was barred as a matter of law.
ruling was perfectly correct.

This

If 330 Partners were liable at all

(which it is not), it would be liable to the tenant partnership not
to the individual partners.
In the first place, there was no allegation of this item
of special damages in Brown's Complaint.

Special damages must be

pled in the Complaint to be recoverable.

Ranch Homes, Inc. v.

Greater Park City Corp., 592 P.2d 620, 624 (Utah 1979).
In the second place, there is absolutely no evidence or
claim

that

Brown's

General

Offices,

Inc.

was

a

third

party

beneficiary of the BLP.
Brown's attempts to argue that Brown's General Offices was
in privity with 330 Partners because it was a partner in Brown's
Shoe Fit Company and therefore can recover whatever damages it
suffered as a result of a supposed breach of the BLP.
General Offices, however, was not a party to the BLP.

Brown's
The cases

cited by Brown's do not support this contention.
Brown's first cites Cottonwood Mall Company v. Sine, supra,
for the proposition

that

"partners are entitled

partnership contract with a third party."
45].

to enforce a

[Appellant's Brief, p.

All Cottonwood Mall held was that a joint venture could sue

in its own name to recover possession of space in its shopping mall
occupied by the defendant.
Brown's next miscites Haynes v. Therrien, No. L-89-306,
1990 Ohio App. Lexis 4494\*7 (Ohio App. 1990), and In Re
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Camhi,

208 N.Y.S. 2d 162 (I960), for the proposition that "partners are
considered to be in privity of contract with the third party, since
partners are both liable for the contractual duties, and entitled
to enforce its obligation."

[Appellants' Brief, p. 45]. Neither

case has any significance to the issue under review in the present
case.

In Haynes, the Court only held that a consent judgment in

a prior real property forfeiture action with respect to real estate
purchased by a partnership was entitled to collateral estoppel
effect in a later case filed by a partner in the partnership who
was in privity with the partnership.

In Camhi, the Court merely

held that a partner was bound by an arbitration clause in an
agreement

signed

by

the

partnership

even

though

he

had

not

personally signed the agreement.
Brown's also miscites Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758 (Utah
1984), for the proposition that "where one partner has suffered
damages distinct from those of the partnership or other partners,
that

partner

can

recover

those

damages

in

addition

incurred by the partnership or other partners."

to

those

[Appellants'

Brief, p. 46]. Kemp stands for no such proposition.
In Kemp, plaintiff, who was an individual member of a joint
venture,

commenced

suit

for

interference

with

contract

and

prospective economic advantage and breach of contract to recover
his 15% share of the damages suffered by the joint venture.

This

Court held that an individual joint venturer may not sue in his own
name to enforce a liability owed to the joint venture and therefore
affirmed the dismissal of the compliant for failure to join an
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indispensable party.

This court did not hold that a partner can

sue for injuries he suffers as a result of a breach of contract
with

the partnership.

The

Court

only noted,

in dicta,

that

plaintiff could not sue directly unless he "could show that he
suffered direct injury personally, as distinguished from injury to
the partnership. . . . "

[680 P.2d at 760].

Finally, there was not even any contention in this case
that Brown's gave 330 Partners notice of any special circumstances
that Brown's General Offices would enter into a management contract
for which it would be paid service fees.

Thus, even if such

damages could otherwise be recovered by Brown's General Offices,
the damages are not recoverable because they were not a foreseeable
result of the alleged breach of the BLP.

See, Saunders v. Sharp,

840 P.2d 796, 809 (Utah 1992).

G.

THE COURT PROPERLY MADE FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED FACT.

Brown's argues that Finding No. 12 is an improper finding
of undisputed fact.

That finding states:

12. During the fall of 1994 and early 1995 the
parties exchanged correspondence and drafts of
proposed lease agreements for the Property, but no
final lease agreement was ever agreed to or entered
into between the parties.
In this connection,
Plaintiffs requested a provision in the lease which,
unlike the Basic Lease Provisions document, provided
a mechanism for appraisers to set the rent during the
option periods if the parties could not agree. [R.
1421-1422].
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Brown's claims that it was error for the court to make this
determination based upon the parties' trial briefs, arguments of
counsel and the stipulation of Tom Brown's testimony contained in
Finding No. 14.

This argument does not accurately reflect the

record.
330 Partners had previously filed a motion for summary
judgment referring extensively to the deposition testimony of Tom
Brown and his attorney, Thomas Green. That motion and the portions
of those depositions were part of the record in this case at the
time of trial. The testimony of Tom Brown and his attorney, Thomas
Green, fully support Finding No. 12.

Indeed, the negotiations

between the parties were all conducted in writing and copies of the
correspondence and proposed leases exchanged between the parties
were attached as exhibits to Brown's Complaint.

[R. 2-66].

Thus,

there could be no dispute as to what the negotiations were.

Green

received

a

draft

lease

from

33 0 Partners'

attorney

and

then

demanded in his October 27, 1994 letter over thirty changes to that
document.

Tom Brown testified he would not enter into a lease

unless all of those changes were made.

Moreover, in early 1995,

Brown's submitted its own proposed lease agreement which, contrary
to the specific provisions of the BLP, contained a mechanism for
appraisers to set the rent during the option periods if the parties
could not agree.

[R. 3, 1 13.5].

These facts were before the

court in the form of admissions of the Brown's representative in
deposition

testimony

and undisputed

documents

finding based thereon was perfectly proper.
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and

the

court's

In this connection, all parties understood that the hearing
on June 11, 1996 at the commencement of trial would effectively be
a motion for summary judgment.
previous

hearing

on

the

legal

Thus, on June 6,
issues, the

1996, at a

following

exchange

occurred between counsel and the court:
The Court: . . . If there is going to be matters
after carefully reviewing the law that clearly fall
within the purview of the court to decide, as opposed
to the jury, then it is this court's feeling that we
ought to make those decisions, whatever they may be,
and proceed only with factual matters for the jury to
decide.
I would suggest that you -- if you think
there is any other law more persuasive than what you
have cited in your pleading thus far, give it to me
before the weekend, so I can read it. And I would
like to have two hours of argument on the questions
Tuesday, June 11th.
Mr. Van Dam: Sounds like what we are going to
be doing is kind of arguing summary judgment on
Tuesday.
We have had very little time. We never
researched nor responded to their motion for summary
judgment.
In the context of trying to prepare for
this trial that's an enormous burden on us.
Mr. Burbidge: I got to tell you, I have seen the
briefs everybody has filed. Everybody is on top of
that
issue.
They
have
drafted
their
jury
instructions. So both of these sides have researched
the cases, understand the cases, have drawn their jury
instructions.
There won't be any surprises on the
cases or the argument. We are ready to go.
Both
sides are ready to go.
The Court:
I am inclined -- and careful
reflection -- I am inclined to spend a couple of
hours. I will be very familiar with all of the law
that's cited.
And we will see where this summary
judgment argument, if that's what you want to label
it, takes us Tuesday morning.
[R. 1569-1570]
[Emphasis added].
The court's action in deciding the legal issues at the
commencement of trial was perfectly proper. Crucially, Brown's has
not appealed on the basis that the court had no authority to
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conduct such a hearing at the commencement of trial.
argument would have been groundless.

Such an

The court was perfectly

entitled to make legal decisions at the commencement of trial, just
as the court would have been entitled to grant judgment based upon
Brown's opening statement or to grant a directed verdict at the
conclusion of Brown's case.
Moreover, any irregularity in this procedure was harmless.
In Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991), the
court granted a summary judgment that was filed four days before
trial

(one business day) and heard the morning of trial.

The

opposing party had not even had the chance to file an opposing
memorandum.

The court held that although Rule 56 was not followed,

any error was harmless because there was no showing of a likelihood
of a different outcome if Rule 56 had been followed.

See also,

Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Utah 1993); Equitable Life
& Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187 (Utah App. 1993).
In the present case, the parties had fully briefed all the
legal issues, both in their trial briefs and in memoranda filed
with the court with reference to the specific hearing.
not been

and

could

not be

any

showing

of

a

There has

likelihood

of

a

different result. The court's decisions were based upon undisputed
documents and Brown's own testimony.
request

additional

time

Moreover, Brown's did not

in order to brief

any

issues or

file

affidavits, but participated in the June 11, 1996 hearing at the
commencement of trial.

Indeed, in that hearing, Brown's obtained
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the dismissal of the claims asserted by 330 Partners in its
Counterclaim.

H.

THE COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED BROWN'S FRAUD CLAIM.

The trial court found that both parties contemplated that
before Brownfs occupied the Property a final lease document would
be

executed

and

the

terms

agreed

incorporated into that document.
concluded

to

in

the

[Finding No. 5].

as a matter of law that Brown's

insufficient because:

BLP

fraud

would

be

The court
claim was

(1) there was no misrepresentation of a

presently existing fact; (2) Brown's could not reasonably rely on
the claimed misrepresentation; and (3) Brown's suffered no damages
as a result of the claimed misrepresentation.

The court's ruling

is perfectly appropriate under the applicable law and the record
in this case.
In

the

first

place,

the

supposed

fact

that

was

misrepresented was 330 Partners' failure to disclose to Brown's
that it allegedly had no intent to be bound by the BLP. However,
the BLP specifically provides that the parties are going to attempt
to negotiate a final lease agreement containing all of the terms
of a lease and that the terms of the BLP would

simply be

incorporated into that document. As demonstrated earlier, neither
side intended to be bound unless and until a final lease was
signed.

There was no basis for any contention that at the time

the BLP was entered into that 33 0 Partners did not intend to
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attempt to negotiate a final lease incorporating the terms.

The

fact that 33 0 Partners may have intended to use the BLP to obtain
financing is irrelevant.

Brown's was well aware of that fact.

Brown's own expert opined that is the normal purpose of such a
document and that 50% of the time such preliminary documents do not
result in a final agreement.
Moreover, as a matter of law, Brown's could not reasonably
have relied upon the claimed misrepresentation, both because the
terms of the BLP were too vague, uncertain and incomplete to permit
such reliance and because of Tom Brown's testimony that Brown's
would not have leased the Property pursuant to the terms of the
BLP.

Again, Tom Brown specifically testified that without binding

agreements for the two three-year option periods, he would not have
leased the Property.

As demonstrated above, and as found by the

court, no binding agreement for the option periods existed.
Third, for the same reason, Brown's suffered no damages as
a result of the alleged fact that 330 Partners did not intend to
be bound by the BLP.

See, e .g. , Hickman v. Groesbeck, 3 89 F.Supp.

769, 779 (D. Utah 1974) ; Mackey & Assoc, v. Russell & Axon Intern.,
819 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Mo. App. 1991).
to be bound by the BLP.

Brown's itself did not intend

Brown's was unwilling to leave the option

periods' rent to future negotiation as provided in the BLP.
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I. . THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 330 PARTNERS1
COUNTERCLAIM FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS.

330 Partners asserted a Counterclaim for abuse of process.
Brown's filed this lawsuit claiming breach of the BLP despite the
fact that Brown's knew it was not willing to abide by the terms of
the BLP (such as they were) because Brown's knew it was not willing
to

lease

the

Property

for the initial

three-year term unless

Brown's had a firm agreement as to the rent to be charged during
the two three-year option periods.

Brown's filed this lawsuit for

the purpose of attempting to force Defendants into either leasing
the Property to Brown's on terms to which 33 0 Partners had not
agreed (not under the terms of the BLP) and to which 33 0 Partners
was not obligated to agree, or to pay Brown's blood money to settle
the lawsuit.
The use of legal process to accomplish an improper purpose,
such as compelling a person to do so something which he would not
otherwise be legally obligated to do, constitutes an abuse of
process.

Crease v. Pleasant Grove City, 519 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah

1974); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 308-09
(Utah 1982) ; Keller v. Rav, Ouinney & Nebeker, 896 F.Supp. 1563 (D.
Utah 1995) .
counterclaim.

An action for abuse of process may be brought as a
Keller, 896 F.Supp at 1570, n. 15; Smith v. Buicich,

699 P.2d 763 (Utah 1985).

The evidence that this case was filed

for an improper purpose was sufficient to require that this claim
be decided by the jury.
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that the order of the trial court dismissing Brown's Complaint
should

be

affirmed

in

all

respects.

The

Order

dismissing

Defendants1 Counterclaim should be reversed and that claim remanded
for trial.

nk
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